- mintGuidanceSession: crypto.randomUUID id, claim-derived chat_id arg,
ONE put at guidance:<id> with same-line expirationTtl (GE1/PG1)
- getGuidanceSession: UUID-shape guard BEFORE any KV touch (V5), exact
4+6-field + type + finite/range validation (the location-pin defensive
read law) — corrupt records read as null, never reach the cron
- deleteGuidanceSession: active trip-end sweep (D-14's server half)
- module header: the types-only note becomes the shape-frozen + service-
owns-every-write law; envelope/snapshot interfaces byte-identical (GE2)
- no new namespace (GE5), no new Env field (GE6) — the chat_sessions
binding is handed in structurally
- GuidanceSessionEnvelope: EXACTLY id, chat_id, route_snapshot, created_at
(SessionClaim field-freeze law — a 5th property means drift)
- GuidanceRouteSnapshot INLINE (D-07: one key, one TTL, ~2h): destination
id/name, distanceM/durationS, polyline6 geometry (05-01 storage format),
startedAtSec resume anchor
- GUIDANCE_SESSION_TTL_SECONDS = 7200 — every Phase 6 write carries it
- guidance:<id> key-scheme doc header; zero runtime behavior (no binding,
no function, no import — GE4 pins it)
Note: header says 'No KV binding' rather than naming the KV type because
the acceptance gate requires that token to appear NOWHERE in the file,
comments included — same law, gate-clean wording.
- kv/location-pin.ts mirrors sessions.ts shape: writePin/getPin/clearPin, key loc:<chat_id> (chat-scoped, claim-derived — never user-id scoped across keys)
- PIN_TTL_SECONDS=300; writePin is the only write path, expirationTtl on the same line referencing the named constant
- getPin is a defensive read: parse guard + shape guard + |lat|<=90 / |lon|<=180 range guard (V5 Input Validation) — corrupt records return null
- privacy.test.mjs: storageModules now scans kv/location-pin.ts, so PG1 (same-line TTL) and PG2 (no persistence-shaped exports) apply automatically
- sessions.ts: mintSession (crypto.randomUUID opaque token, T-02-05), rotate-on-new deletes prior session record via chat pointer (D-07), both puts carry expirationTtl: SESSION_TTL_SECONDS on the call line (PRIV-02)
- SESSION_TTL_SECONDS = 900 pairs the session envelope with the D-13 freshness window
- SessionClaim is exactly D-08: user_id, chat_id, issued_at, language_code — nothing else serializes to storage
- sessions.test.mjs: in-memory KV fake asserting finite expirationTtl on every put; D-08 key-set equality; rotate removes old token; expired-token → null (D-14 class)
- privacy.test.mjs: PG1 same-line expirationTtl source gate (auto-tightens to webhook.ts when plan 03 adds it) + PG2 no persistence-shaped exports
- 18/18 PASS across initdata + sessions + privacy suites; full plan GREEN
araharah-executor