test(02-01): hand-rolled harness + RED initdata vector suite (D-12, TDD RED)
- bot/test/harness.mjs: zero-dep registry (test(name, fn)) - bot/test/runner.mjs: auto-discovers *.test.mjs, suite-load failure -> FAIL case, exit 0 iff all green - bot/test/initdata.test.mjs: T1-T7 vector contract signed via node:crypto in-suite (T1 known-good, T2 tampered, T3 stale 3600s, T4 boundary 899/901, T5 order-independence, T6a-c malformed, T7 RFC-4231 node:crypto independence pin) - demonstrated RED: 8 FAILs / exit 1 against missing src/security/initdata.ts; GREEN lands in plan 02
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araharah-executor
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#!/usr/bin/env node
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/*
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* initdata.test.mjs — Telegram WebApp initData HMAC validation vector suite.
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* ------------------------------------------------------------------
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* RED phase (plan 02-01, D-15/D-17 + RESEARCH Pitfalls 1–3):
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* every validator case below fails while ../src/security/initdata.ts
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* does not exist — the module import happens lazily inside each case,
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* so T1–T7 report one FAIL per vector instead of a lost suite load.
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* Plan 02 goes GREEN against exactly this contract.
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*
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* Run: npm test -w bot (exit 0 = all green)
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*
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* Contract under test (D-13 freshness window = 900 s):
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* T1 known-good initData (signed here via node:crypto) → ok:true,
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* user.id === 42, languageCode === "ms"
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* T2 any character of hash flipped → { ok:false, reason:"tampered" }
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* T3 auth_date = now − 3600 with default 900 s window → reason:"stale"
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* T4 freshness boundary: age 899 s → ok:true; age 901 s → "stale"
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* T5 order-independence: fields arriving out of alphabetical order
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* (user before auth_date, start_param mixed in) still validate
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* T6 malformed rejects: (a) hash field missing, (b) auth_date
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* non-numeric, (c) user JSON missing id
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* T7 suite self-check: node:crypto HMAC(key="key", data="data")
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* equals the RFC-4231 test-case-1 vector — pins the test suite's
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* HMAC primitive independent of the SubtleCrypto path under test
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*
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* The signing helper lives IN this file (createHmac twice: secret =
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* HMAC(key="WebAppData", data=botToken); hash = HMAC(key=secretBytes,
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* data=checkString)) — independent of the implementation path.
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* Fixtures stay in-process; nothing is written into the repo.
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*/
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import { strict as assert } from "node:assert";
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import { createHmac } from "node:crypto";
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import { test } from "./harness.mjs";
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const TEST_TOKEN = "12345:TESTTOKEN";
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/** RFC-4231 test case 1 expected digest (self-check pin). */
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const RFC4231_CASE1 =
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"5031fe3d989c6d1537a013fa6e739da23463fdaec3b70137d828e36ace221bd0";
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// Lazy validator load — missing module => per-case ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND (the RED state).
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let validatorPromise = null;
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function loadValidator() {
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if (!validatorPromise) {
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validatorPromise = import("../src/security/initdata.ts").then(
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(m) => m.validateInitData,
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);
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}
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return validatorPromise;
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}
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/* ————— node:crypto signing helpers (test-side, independent path) ————— */
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/** Data-check-string: fields sorted by key, key=value, LF-joined (Telegram spec). */
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function dataCheckString(fields) {
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return fields
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.filter(([key]) => key !== "hash" && key !== "signature")
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.slice()
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.sort((a, b) => (a[0] < b[0] ? -1 : a[0] > b[0] ? 1 : 0))
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.map(([key, value]) => `${key}=${value}`)
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.join("\n");
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}
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/** secret_key = HMAC_SHA256(key="WebAppData", data=botToken), as digest bytes. */
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function telegramSecretKey(botToken) {
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return createHmac("sha256", "WebAppData").update(botToken, "utf8").digest();
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}
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/**
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* Build a wire-format initData string signed with the test token.
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* `fields` is [key, plainValue] in arrival ORDER (wire order preserved);
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* the check-string is computed over the key-sorted decoded values.
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*/
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function buildInitData(fields) {
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const hash = createHmac("sha256", telegramSecretKey(TEST_TOKEN))
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.update(dataCheckString(fields), "utf8")
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.digest("hex");
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const wire = fields
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.map(([key, value]) => `${key}=${encodeURIComponent(value)}`)
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.join("&");
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return `${wire}&hash=${hash}`;
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}
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function signedUser(authDateSeconds, extraFields = []) {
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return buildInitData([
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...extraFields,
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["user", JSON.stringify({ id: 42, first_name: "Zul", language_code: "ms" })],
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["auth_date", String(authDateSeconds)],
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]);
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}
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/* ————— T1 — known-good signed initData ————— */
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test("T1 known-good signed initData → ok:true, user.id 42, languageCode ms", async () => {
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const validateInitData = await loadValidator();
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const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
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const raw = signedUser(now);
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const res = await validateInitData(raw, TEST_TOKEN);
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assert.equal(res.ok, true, `expected ok:true, got ${JSON.stringify(res)}`);
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assert.equal(res.user.id, 42);
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assert.equal(res.languageCode, "ms");
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});
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/* ————— T2 — flipped hash character → tampered ————— */
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test("T2 flipped hash character → reason tampered", async () => {
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const validateInitData = await loadValidator();
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const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
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const raw = signedUser(now);
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const match = raw.match(/hash=([0-9a-f]{64})$/);
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assert.ok(match, "signed fixture must carry a 64-hex-char hash");
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const flippedHash = String.fromCharCode(
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match[1].charCodeAt(0) ^ 1,
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) + match[1].slice(1);
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const tampered = raw.slice(0, match.index) + `hash=${flippedHash}`;
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const res = await validateInitData(tampered, TEST_TOKEN);
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assert.equal(res.ok, false, `expected ok:false, got ${JSON.stringify(res)}`);
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assert.equal(res.reason, "tampered");
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});
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/* ————— T3 — stale beyond the 900 s window ————— */
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test("T3 auth_date 3600 s old with default 900 s window → reason stale", async () => {
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const validateInitData = await loadValidator();
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const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
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const raw = signedUser(now - 3600);
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const res = await validateInitData(raw, TEST_TOKEN);
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assert.equal(res.ok, false, `expected ok:false, got ${JSON.stringify(res)}`);
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assert.equal(res.reason, "stale");
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});
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/* ————— T4 — freshness boundary (899 ok / 901 stale) ————— */
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test("T4 freshness boundary: age 899 s → ok:true", async () => {
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const validateInitData = await loadValidator();
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const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
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const raw = signedUser(now - 899);
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const res = await validateInitData(raw, TEST_TOKEN);
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assert.equal(res.ok, true, `expected ok:true at 899 s, got ${JSON.stringify(res)}`);
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});
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test("T4 freshness boundary: age 901 s → reason stale", async () => {
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const validateInitData = await loadValidator();
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const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
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const raw = signedUser(now - 901);
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const res = await validateInitData(raw, TEST_TOKEN);
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assert.equal(res.ok, false, `expected ok:false at 901 s, got ${JSON.stringify(res)}`);
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assert.equal(res.reason, "stale");
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});
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/* ————— T5 — field order independence (RESEARCH Pitfall 1) ————— */
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test("T5 fields arriving out of alphabetical order still validate", async () => {
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const validateInitData = await loadValidator();
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const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
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// Arrival order: user, start_param, auth_date — none alphabetical.
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// Signed check-string must still be built over the sorted keys.
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const raw = signedUser(now, [["start_param", "klcc"]]);
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const res = await validateInitData(raw, TEST_TOKEN);
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assert.equal(
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res.ok,
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true,
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`out-of-order fields must validate (Pitfall 1), got ${JSON.stringify(res)}`,
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);
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assert.equal(res.user.id, 42);
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});
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/* ————— T6 — malformed rejection classes ————— */
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test("T6a initData without hash field → reason malformed", async () => {
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const validateInitData = await loadValidator();
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const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
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const raw = signedUser(now).replace(/&hash=[0-9a-f]{64}$/, "");
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const res = await validateInitData(raw, TEST_TOKEN);
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assert.equal(res.ok, false, `expected ok:false, got ${JSON.stringify(res)}`);
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assert.equal(res.reason, "malformed");
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});
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test("T6b non-numeric auth_date → reason malformed", async () => {
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const validateInitData = await loadValidator();
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const raw = signedUser("forty-two");
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const res = await validateInitData(raw, TEST_TOKEN);
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assert.equal(res.ok, false, `expected ok:false, got ${JSON.stringify(res)}`);
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assert.equal(res.reason, "malformed");
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});
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test("T6c user JSON missing id → reason malformed", async () => {
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const validateInitData = await loadValidator();
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const raw = buildInitData([
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["user", JSON.stringify({ first_name: "Zul", language_code: "ms" })],
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["auth_date", String(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000))],
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]);
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const res = await validateInitData(raw, TEST_TOKEN);
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assert.equal(res.ok, false, `expected ok:false, got ${JSON.stringify(res)}`);
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assert.equal(res.reason, "malformed");
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});
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/* ————— T7 — RFC-4231 pin (independence self-check) ————— */
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test("T7 node:crypto HMAC(key='key', data='data') equals RFC-4231 case 1 vector", () => {
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const hex = createHmac("sha256", "key").update("data", "utf8").digest("hex");
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assert.equal(hex, RFC4231_CASE1);
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});
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